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WHEN LAWYERS REPRESENT THEIR
ADVERSARIES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
ARISING OUT OF THE LAWYER-LAWYER
RELATIONSHIP
Steven C. Krane"

I.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

All lawyers have heard the proverb: "He that is his own lawyer
has a fool for a client." Regardless of how one may feel about the
veracity of that maxim, it is beyond question that lawyers frequently
encounter the need for legal services in their own right, and that they

often retain other attorneys to provide those services instead of undertaking them themselves.2 This Article will address the principal ethical issue-the risk of disqualification for conflict of interest-that

may arise when a lawyer or law firm chooses to retain an attorney or
law firm that happens to be representing a client in an unrelated
matter whose interests are adverse to those of a client represented by
the retaining lawyer or firm.

There are several contexts in which lawyers may seek out other
lawyers to represent them. As discussed below, resolution of the
principal ethical issues engendered by the relationship is determined
in large part by the factual context in which the relationship arises.

* J.D. New York University, 1981; Parner, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn,
New York, NY; Chair, Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York (1993-date); Chair, Special Committee to Review the Code
of Professional Responsibility of the New York State Bar Association (1995-date); Member,
Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association (1990-1994). The
author wishes to thank Proskauer summer associate Bryan Pe-Folkes for his assistance in the
preparation of this article. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER § 25.3 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986)
(quoting FACTS ON FILE DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS (Rosalind Fergusson ed., 1983)).
2. As former "First Brother" Billy Carter succinctly put it, "Sometimes even lawyers
need lawyers." A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS § 88.13, at 103 (S. James & C.
Stebbings eds., 1987).
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Facile categorization, such as personal versus professional matters,
does not provide a sufficient basis on which to analyze the situation.
Greater differentiation is required to take into account the subtle
distinctions and divergent implications between and among the following situations.
A. Lawyers as People

Lawyers often require the assistance of counsel in their personal
affairs. Whether for convenience, or because of a lack of expertise or
confidence in the ability to handle the matter pro se, lawyers regularly hire other lawyers to represent them in matters having nothing to
do with the area in which they practice or with the "business" of
practicing law. Thus, whether for the purchase or sale of a residence,
for domestic relations matters, for estate planning matters, or for a
variety of other reasons, lawyers often hire other lawyers to provide
them with professional services in their individual, private capacities.
B. Lawyers in Their Business Dealings

Lawyers also routinely retain outside counsel to represent them
in their business affairs. The practice of law has become a highly
competitive business A lawyer is as much in need of the full range
of legal services as any other businessperson. Issues of partnership
taxation, real estate leasing, disputes with vendors, and employment
litigation are just a few of the business-related matters on which a
firm may seek legal guidance. Similarly, outside counsel is often
employed to assist in intra-firm disputes, such as litigation arising out
of the departure of partners and associated financial and client solicitation issues While some large law firms may well be able to find

3. It has not always been so perceived, at least by the leaders of the profession itself.
For example, Canon 12 of the ABA Canons of Ethics, originally adopted in 1908 and in
effect until the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, admonished

lawyers that "the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 12 (1967). Any doubts
concerning the lack of currency of this view were laid to rest by the United States Supreme

Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975), which held that "learned
professions," including the practice of law, are engaged in "trade or commerce" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act
4. See generally Steven C. Krane, Proceed With Caution: Mitigating Damaging Departures after Denburg, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 29, 1993, at 1; Steven C. Krane, Ethical and Professional Issues Associated With Departing Attorneys, in EMPLOYMENT LAW AND HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES IN LAw FIRMS AND PROFESSIONAL PARTNERSHIPS (1993).
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this expertise in-house, they also occasionally seek outside advice in
complex financial or commercial matters or when other circumstances
warrant.
C. Lawyers in Need of Professional Guidance
Lawyers also hire other lawyers when they confront professional
quandaries such as client perjury or fraud and other confidentiality
concerns, conflicts of interest, and attorney-client disputes.5 Whether
in matters that may give rise to substantial financial exposure or
otherwise, the outside counsel they select may be another lawyer in
the field or a distinguished ethicist from whom a formal opinion is
sought.
D. Lawyers in Trouble
Law firms ordinarily seek outside counsel in times of crisis, such
as when charged with malpractice by clients or misconduct by regulatory agencies.6 Correspondingly, when an individual lawyer is
charged with a disciplinary violation (law firms as entities are not
subject to professional discipline), the lawyer or the firm may well
retain an expert in such matters either to appear as an advocate or to
assist through counselling and guidance! Indeed, because most lawyers do not handle such matters on a regular basis, they are more
inclined to retain outside counsel given that catastrophic sums of
money, their invaluable reputation, or their very right to practice law
may be at risk.
E. Lawyers as Co-Counsel
Lawyers also hire other lawyers to assist them in representing
their own clients.8 A lawyer may seek to associate with a practitioner

5. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor: PracticalBenefits for
the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 1011, 1028-29 (1994).

6. Id.;
see, e.g., Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, THE
AM. LAW., May 1992, at 68.
7. Cf. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.4.1 (Practitioner's ed.
1986) (discussing right to counsel in attorney disciplinary proceedings); see also Epstein,
supra note 5, at 1028-29.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1, cmL 2 (1989) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] ("Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a
lawyer of established competence in the field in question."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; Avoiding Malpractice, Laws. Man.
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who is more experienced in a particular field of law to counsel or
assist the lawyer in specific matters. For example, a lawyer representing a client in the purchase of a business may retain a trademark
attorney to help evaluate the strength of the marks being purchased
and an environmental lawyer to assess the target company's exposure
with respect to certain of its industrial activities. Doing so is not only
good practice, it is often required by fundamental principles of ethics
governing lawyer competence.9 Of course, lawyers whose practice
takes them out of their home state regularly retain local counsel to
provide a variety of services, including advice on local practices and
opinions on issues of state law. Indeed, retention of local counsel in
litigated matters is frequently required by local court rule." It is important to bear in mind that, in this context, the retained lawyer does
not represent the lawyer, but rather the lawyer's client. Regardless of

who retains the lawyer, or even who pays the bills, the lawyer owes
his or her duty of loyalty to the ultimate client. 1
F. Lawyers as Expert Witnesses
Occasionally, the need arises for lawyers to serve as expert witnesses in judicial proceedings, such as in cases involving the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, conflicts of interest, malpractice claims, or

on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) § 301:1007 (Feb. 15, 1995).
This Article will refer throughout to provisions of both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), as promulgated and amended by the American Bar
Association ("ABA") between 1969 and 1983, and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules"), as promulgated and amended by the ABA from 1983 to the present. Each
state, except California, has adopted either the Model Code or the Model Rules, either intact
or with amendments adopted by the appropriate attorney regulatory body within the state.
While the majority of states have adopted the Model Rules, see STEP-EN GnIMi S & RoY D.
SiMON, JR., REGtULATION OF LAWYERs, STATUTES AND STANDARDS xvi (1995), New York
has preserved both the framework and, to a great extent, the substance of the Model Code.
To the extent the New York Code differs materially from the Model Code, those differences
are noted herein. While California has developed its own set of statutes and ethics rules to
govern lawyer conduct, the principles governing conflicts of interest are substantially equivalent to those in the Model Rules and Model Code.
9. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.1 cmt. 2; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR
6-101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.").
10. See generally Pro Hac Vice, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct §§ 21:2105 to :2111
(May 22, 1991) (surveying state requirements for pro hac vice admission to state courts);
WOLFRAM, supra note 7, at § 15.4.3.
11. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.8(f); MODEL. CODE, supra note 8, DR 5107(B).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/2

4

Krane: When Lawyers Represent Their Adversaries: Conflicts of Interest A
1995]

WHEW LAWYERS REPRESENT THEIR ADVERSARIES

ethical issues. 2 In malpractice cases, for example, the need for expert testimony to establish the standard of care required of a reason-

able lawyer is generally recognized. 3 As in the co-counsel context,
there should ordinarily be no attorney-client relationship, as such,

between the expert witness, who is to opine on factual issues regarding the manner in which lawyers practice law, and the litigant
(whether disgruntled client or accused lawyer) on whose behalf the

lawyer is to testify.'
Various ethical principles are implicated by the retention of law-

yers in these factual contexts. For example, by virtue of the need to
preserve the confidentiality of information provided by a client to a
lawyer, it is generally impermissible to retain or consult with counsel
in client-related matters without the client's consent. Additional
complications may arise when the hiring lawyer intends to divide the

12. See Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1990); Barth v. Reagan, 564
N.E.2d 1196 (Il1. 1990); Pongonis v. Saab, 486 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1985); Carlson v. Morton,
745 P.2d 1133 (Mont. 1987). See generally 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRAcrrCE, § 27.15, at 668 (3d ed. 1989); Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F.
McLaughlin, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP. LJ. 1351 (1988); Michael A. DiSabitino, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action
Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R. 4th 170 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 787; Barth, 564 N.E.2d at 1196; Pongonis, 486
N.E.2d at 28; Carlson, 745 P.2d at 1133; Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. CL App.
1986). See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 12, § 27.15, at 668; WoLFRAM, supra
note 7, § 5.6, at 211.
14. Cf The State Bar of California, California Compendium on Professional Responsibility, San Diego County Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 1989-4 (1995) (analyzing attorney-expert witness
conflict of interest on the basis of the economic interest in the continued relationship rather
than the concurrent relationship of clients with materially differing interests).
15.
9]n the absence of consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer should not
associate another lawyer in the handling of a matter, nor should he, in the absence
of consent, seek counsel from another lawyer if there is a reasonable possibility
that the identity of the client or his confidences or secrets would be revealed to
such lawyer.
MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 4-2; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 6-3 ("A lawyer
offered employment in a matter in which he is not and does not expect to become [competent] should either decline the employment or, with the consent of his client, accept the
employment and associate a lawyer who is competent in the matter." (emphasis added)). See
generally MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out representation."). Cf Davis v.
York Int'l Corp., No. 92-3545, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7137 (D. Md. May 24, 1993) (holding
that lawyer lecturing in continuing legal education course did not enter into attorney-client
relationship with client of student in course who asked a question regarding a pending matter,
as there was no offer or request by the client for legal services).
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fee for the matter with the retained counsel.' 6 These issues, though
of great importance, are ordinarily resolved without significant analytical difficulty. This Article will focus, instead, on a problem that may
well give rise to analytical difficulties in certain contexts and that
may, unlike associating with an "expert" or dividing a fee, often be
perplexing.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario: Louise Lawyer, a
solo practitioner, represents plaintiff Modest Industries in a commercial contract litigation against Titanic Enterprises. Titanic is represented in the litigation by Anthony Adversary, who is a member of
Megafirm. Lawyer has just been charged by state disciplinary authorities with having mishandled funds she had been holding on behalf of
a client (other than Modest Industries). While she insists that she has
done nothing wrong and that the charge is groundless, Lawyer recognizes the seriousness of the disciplinary proceedings-the risk of
disbarment, suspension or public censure-and seeks to engage, as her
attorney, Edward Ethical, a highly respected lawyer in the community
who has frequently handled professional responsibility issues raised in
litigation. Lawyer's problem is that Ethical is a senior partner in
Megafirm.
The answer that has been given by the few authorities that have
considered this situation, including ethics committees in New York,
New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kentucky, is that it creates a conflict of interest for both
Lawyer and Megafirm, not so much because it would involve them in
representing conflicting client interests in the conventional sense, but

16. Model Rule 1.5(e) permits lawyers to divide fees only if:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by
written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.5(e). New York's disciplinary rules are similar except

that (i)
the client must affirmatively consent to the employment of the other lawyer after full
disclosure that a division of fees will be made; and (ii) a "written agreement with the client"

regarding the assumption of joint responsibility is not required-the lawyers need only give
"a writing" to the client confirming that each assumes joint responsibility for the representation. N.Y. JuD. LAW app. DR 2-107(A) (McKinney 1992). The Model Code does not permit
a fee division unless: (i) the client consented after full disclosure; (ii) "the division [was]
made in proportion to the services performed and [the] responsibility assumed by each"; and

(iii)
the total fee did not "clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services"
provided to the client. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 2-107 (A).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/2
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because of the risk that the business or personal interests arising out
of the attorney-client relationship between them may somehow impact
adversely upon their exercise of independent professional judgment on
behalf of their respective clients." These authorities note, however,
that the conflict may be cured by obtaining waivers from the affected
clients-both of them-reflecting their consent to Lawyer's retention
of Megafirm, after full disclosure to each of them of the potential and
theoretical risks and disadvantages of the situation.
But Lawyer cannot, as a practical matter, ask Modest for consent. She does not want any of her other clients to know that she has
been accused of violating the rules governing the handling of client
funds, an ignominious allegation she fully believes she will be able to
refute. Must she therefore forego her choice of counsel in these critical circumstances? Is this really the kind of conflict of interest the
ethics rules had in mind? Moreover, does it make practical sense?
Ethical barely knows Adversary, and he knows even less about Titanic Enterprises or the Modest lawsuit. Adversary and Ethical are in the
same room with each other only once a year at the annual firm dinner. Is it reasonable to conclude that Adversary is going to soft-pedal
his representation of Titanic because Ethical is serving as Lawyer's
counsel in the disciplinary proceeding and Megafirm is receiving a
small fee from Lawyer? Is it reasonable to conclude that Lawyer is
going to be less aggressive in her advocacy of Modest's rights because of her newly established relationship with the law firm representing Titanic? Is the only real issue whether Lawyer believes that
her interests are best served by having Ethical represent her, notwithstanding the fact that Ethical's firm is duty bound to defeat her
client's claim? These questions and others will be addressed in this
Article. Indeed, there are virtually endless variations on the scenario
set forth above. The problem can just as easily arise in a small town,
where there only may be a handful of lawyers from which to
choose-and all of them adversaries in one setting or another-or
where the hiring lawyer is the "megafirm" which could potentially
provide a significant income stream to the solo practitioner.
It is the conclusion of this Article that the situation should not
be governed by a blanket rule establishing a prerequisite of full disclosure and client consent in all circumstances. Rather, a more flexible approach must be taken that gives due consideration to the reali-

17. See infra part I.A.
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ties of the particular circumstances involved. Factors to be weighed
would be: (a) the intensity and duration of the relationship between
the adversaries; (b) the intensity and duration of the adversaries'
relationships with their respective clients; (c) the nature of the lawyerlawyer representation; (d) the nature of the work currently being
performed by the lawyers for their respective clients; (e) the relationship, if any, between the lawyer-lawyer representation and the representation of either client; and (f) the relative importance of the representations to the respective lawyers or firms. Unlike the bright-line
test suggested by some authorities, this approach provides for an
effective balance between the reasonable expectations of the clients
and the legitimate interests of the lawyers.

U. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Ethical Paradigms
In resolving any ethical quandary, just as in addressing any other
legal problem, a critical step is identifying the issue. Authorities have
differed as to the nature of the perceived conflict of interest when a
lawyer hires an adversary to provide legal services, and generally
choose one of two models. The first is the rule that precludes lawyers
from representing a client whose interests conflict with, or differ
from, those of another client of the lawyer."8 The second is the admonition not to represent a client if the lawyer's independent professional judgment on behalf of the client will be affected by the
lawyer's own personal or business interests. 9 This Article postulates
that only the latter rule is appropriately applied to the lawyer-adversary relationship.
1. Clients with Conflicting Interests
Model Rule 1.7(a) generally prevents a lawyer from representing
a client "if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client . . . ." Similarly, the Model Code provides, that a
lawyer may not accept or continue employment by a client if the
lawyer's "independent professional judgment in behalf of [another]

18. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-

105(A), (B).
19. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-

101(A).
20. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(a).
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client will be or is likely to be adversely affected... or if it would
be likely to involve [the lawyer] in representing differing interests,"
which are defined as including "every interest that will adversely

affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client,
whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest."2

Both provisions allow the affected lawyer to proceed with the representation, subject to certain limitations, if the consent of the affected

clients is obtained.'
Although it could be argued that the provisions of the Model
Code and the Model Rules differ as to the degree of adversity re-

quired to give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest, there is no
dispute that both apply only when one lawyer or firm has two or
more clients whose interests differ or conflict. This does not mean
that the lawyer must represent both clients in connection with the
matter in which their interests differ; indeed, no one would suggest
that Megafirn could represent both Modest Industries and Titanic

Enterprises in the litigation between them, even with their consent'
Rather, the rules prevent a lawyer from taking action on behalf of
one client that is contrary to the interests of another client.' That
the matters are unrelated is immaterial. Thus, Megafirm could not
represent Titanic Enterprises in the Modest Industries suit if, for ex-

ample, it regularly advised Modest on customs law issues, unless both

21. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105(A), (B). The Model Code also provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of [the] client and free of compromising influences
and loyalties. Neither [the lawyer's] personal interests, the interests of other clients,
nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute [the lawyer's] loyalty
to [the] client.
Id. EC 5-1.
22. See also REsTATEMENT grHtmD) OF THE LAW GOVERNNG LAWYERS § 201, (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) [hereinafter RESrATEmENT THnm]. Section 201 provides:
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and
conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer may not represent a client if the representation would constitute a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists if there is
a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially
and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to
another current client, to a former client, or to a third person.

Id.
23. See, e.g., Alayo I Carreras v. Cable w. Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1167 (D.P.R. 1986);
Chateau de Ville Prod., Inc. v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Blatt, 201 A.2d 715 (NJ. 1964); 'Wolfram, supra note 7, § 7.3.2.
24. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5105(A), (B).
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Titanic and Modest consented in the manner provided in the applicable rule.
2. Lawyer's Personal or Business Interests
It is also considered a conflict of interest under Model Rule
1.7(b) for a lawyer to accept or continue representing a client if that
representation "may be materially limited by... the lawyer's own
interests ....

."

Model Code DR 5-101(A) similarly bars a lawyer

from "accept[ing] employment if the exercise of his professional
judgment on behalf of his client . . . may be affected by his own

financial, business, property or personal interests." This rule is designed to protect a single attorney-client relationship from being adversely affected by, broadly speaking, the personal interests of the
lawyer.' For example, Lawyer would violate these rules if, without
properly obtaining Modest's consent after full disclosure, she initiated
a substantial lawsuit on behalf of Modest against Little Co., a corporation in which Lawyer had made what to her was a major personal
investment. There, the presumed risk would be that Lawyer would
have an interest in repressing her zealousness on behalf of Modest to
avoid jeopardizing her investment in Little Co.
3. Choosing the Right Rubric
In the hypothetical scenario discussed above, Lawyer is not representing two clients with conflicting interests. She is representing a
single client, Modest, whose interests conflict with an entity being
represented by the same law firm that is representing her in the disciplinary proceeding. The rule prohibiting the representation of two
clients with conflicting interests simply does not apply. The only rule
even arguably applicable to Lawyer is that based on the lawyer's own
personal or business interests.' On the other side are Adversary and
Ethical who, with their firm, must be considered a single lawyer for
conflict of interest purposes.29 Megafirm would. represent both Titan25. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b).
26. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-101(A).
27. See also RESTATEMENr THMrD, supra note 22, § 206. Section 206 provides:
Unless the affected client consents to the representation under the conditions and
limitations provided in § 202, a lawyer may not undertake or continue to represent

a client if a substantial risk exists that a financial or other personal interest of the
lawyer will materially and adversely affect the lawyer's representation of the client.
28. MODEL RuLES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5101(A).
29. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.10(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-
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ic and Lawyer, the attorney representing the party adverse to Titanic.
Here, the differences between the Model Code and the Model Rules
are of some significance. Model Rule 1.7(a) only applies if the repre-

sentation of one client "will be directly adverse" to another client."
The Comments to that provision explain that "simultaneous represen-

tation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as competing economic enterprises, does not require

consent of the respective clients."' While Megafirm's situation does
not quite reach that degree of attenuation, the fact remains that
Megafirm is not representing Modest, but only the lawyer for Modest. 2 The Model Code, in contrast, could be viewed as fixing a lower threshold of adversity. The new representation must only be "like-

ly" to "affect" the lawyer's independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client before a conflict arises under DR 5-105."3 This

hazy language is susceptible to unduly broad interpretations, and has
sometimes resulted in unwarranted expansion of the rule to preclude

lawyers from accepting matters that have only secondary or tertiary
impacts on an existing client. 4
In any event, the rule is inapplicable to Megafirm's situation,

which is appropriately analyzed under the "lawyer's personal or business interest" rules. Megafirm owes a fiduciary duty and a duty of

loyalty to Lawyer, just like any other client 5 The firm is also receiving money from Lawyer, which gives Megafirm a financial interest in perpetuating its relationship with Lawyer. Although, as dis-

105(D).
30. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(a).
31. Id. at Cnt.
32. For a discussion regarding the possible need to treat both Modest and Lawyer, for
conflict of interest principles, as the "client' in these circumstances, see infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
33. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105(A), (B).
34. See, e.g., Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188 (D.NJ.
1989); Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986);
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992). See generally
Steven C. Krane, Re-Evaluating Expectations in the Attorney-Client Relationship, in THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 7, 12-15 (1994).
35. For a discussion of fiduciary duty, see, for example, Avianca v. Correia, 705 F.
Supp 666 (D.D.C. 1989) (lawyer owes fiduciary duty to client); Goldman v. Kane, 329
N.E.2d 770 (Mass. App. 1975) (same); MAILEK & SMITH, supra note 12, §§ 12.17, 13.23
(same). For a discussion of the duty of loyalty, see, for example, Fund of Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d Cir. 1977); Jeffry v. Pounds, 136 Cal
Rptr. 373, 376 (Ct. App. 1977); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1495
(1982); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 174 & n.2 (1990);
GEOiFREY HAzARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 33-38 (1978).
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cussed below, serious questions can be raised as to whether these
facts truly have an effect on the attorney-client relationship, the
lawyer's personal or business interest rules provide the proper rubric
for analysis.
B. Prior Efforts at Resolution
The ethical issues posed by a lawyer's retention of adversary

counsel have been addressed mainly in a handful of bar association
ethics opinions. 6 The discussion below will focus on those opinions.
1. The Per Se Prohibition
In- 1939, the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("New York

City Committee") issued the first opinion to confront the issue, opinion number 502 ("New York City 502").' The opinion addressed a
situation in which, during the course of litigation, the inquiring law-

yer ("A") had become acquainted with the attorney representing the
adversary ("B").38 B then hired A to perform legal services for B's
clients, such as arguing motions and preparing briefs.39 A, who continued to represent his client in the litigation, inquired as to whether
his conduct was proper.' The New York City Committee, citing
Canon 6 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics,4' ruled that the

36. Research uncovered only one judicial decision that specifically addressed problems
associated with the adversary-client. In Zuck v. Alabama, the court held that a criminal defendant had been denied the effective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys represented the prosecutor in an unrelated matter. 588 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
833 (1979). Voicing the concern that "the defense attorneys were subject to the encumbrance
that the prosecutor might take umbrage at a vigorous defense of Zuck and dispense with the
services of their firm[,] .. . [a] conflict [that] could conceivably have infected the entire
trial," the court ruled that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at
439-40.
37. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 502 (1939) [hereinafter New York City 502].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. CANONs OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 6 (1908) provided as follows:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with
the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
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inquirer, A, could not accept employment from his adversary, B, even
if all affected clients gave their consent:
It may well be that none of the matters in which A acts for B
adversely affect any interest of the clients of A's firm or of A, yet
we think that so long as B is actively engaged in any litigation as
an opposing counsel to A, A should not accept retainers from B,
because to do so might make it difficult for A to represent the
client with undivided fidelity. Although A and B may intend to act
in the utmost good faith, the natural human impulse of A would be
to avoid offending B. Under these circumstances, we think that
during any period while A and B are actively engaged in litigation
on opposite sides, it would be improper for A to accept retainers
from B and for B to offer retainers to A 2
New York City 502 therefore purported to create a per se ban
against lawyers accepting employment from adversary counsel. Curiously, the New York City Committee had reached a conflicting conclusion five years earlier in its Opinion Number 307, albeit in a
slightly different factual setting.43 There, the inquiring lawyer had
retained counsel in Chicago to assist in the prosecution of certain
claims of his clients.' Defense counsel in that case asked the inquirer whether he would be willing to handle some unrelated matters in
New York.' The New York City Committee, citing no authority,
held that the arrangement presented a consentable conflict
[T]he Committee sees no objection to the establishment of professional relations between the two attorneys upon new matters that
have no connection whatever with litigation in which such attorneys
have represented clients with conflicting interests, provided the fact
is disclosed to the client, and no objection thereto is raised.'
This opinion is not cited in New York City 502.

him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
42. New York City 502, supra note 37.
43. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 307 (1934).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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An approach similar to that of New York City 502 was taken by
the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of
Michigan ("Michigan Committee") over forty years later in its informal opinion, which addressed an inquiry from a lawyer who represented another lawyer in a divorce action.47 The inquirer wished to
represent another client in a divorce action in which his lawyer-client
represented the adversary." The Michigan Committee concluded that
this would be improper, but based its decision chiefly upon confidentiality concerns:
While attorney Z's divorce action and Mrs. X's divorce action
are presumably completely unrelated factually, we believe there is
still an ethical difficulty under DR 4-101. It seems inevitable that
your representation of attorney Z will make you privy to his views
as to appropriate litigation tactics, negotiating techniques, property
division, support levels, and the like. We believe such matters
would be "secrets" as defined in DR 4-101(A), and accordingly you
could not reveal such matters without attorney Z's informed consent,
which it would seem attorney Z's obligation to Mr. X would prohibit him from giving.49
The Michigan Committee proceeded also to determine that the representation would be improper under DR 5-105, observing conclusorily
that it would be "difficult to see how the independence of your professional judgment in the one matter would not be adversely affected
by your involvement in the other."5 Consent was not available to
cure this conflict because the preconditions of DR 5-105(C) were not
met. In the eyes of the Michigan Committee, because of the "clear
appearance of impropriety" that dual representation would create, it
was not "obvious that [the lawyer could] adequately represent [each
client's] interest."5 '
More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics ("New Jersey Committee") embraced this
rigid approach52 and branded as unethical a lawyer's representation
in a personal injury matter of a client/attorney who was also the

47. State Bar of Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI649 (1981) [hereinafter Michigan CI-649].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 678 (1994)
[hereinafter New Jersey 678].
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lawyer's adversary in an unrelated contract case, notwithstanding the
fact that both clients in the contract case had consented after full
disclosure.53 Conceding that the representation would not be improper under the conventional conflict of interest rules embodied in the
Model Rules,54 the New Jersey Committee relied solely upon the
New Jersey ethics rule barring representation "in certain cases or
situations creating an appearance of impropriety rather than an actual
' Specifically, the New Jersey Committee felt that the pubconflict."55
lic might conclude "that the inquiring attorney or the client/attorney
may obtain unfair advantages and that the inquiring attorney may, in
some manner, suppress vigorous representation to preserve his rela'
tionship with his client/attorney."56
These opinions stand for a broad, unquestioning prohibition
against lawyers entering into attorney-client relationships with their
adversaries, even in materially unrelated cases. For the reasons discussed below, such a view ignores the substance of the affiliation and
exaggerates-by failing even to evaluate-the minimal reasonably
foreseeable risks that the adversary-client relationship poses to clients.
2. The Flexible Approach
At the other extreme are opinions such as Iowa Formal Ethics
Opinion 92-28,"7 which found no impropriety whatsoever in the proposed representation of an adversary:
You state that in your community of 8000 you and lawyer A
frequently are adversaries in litigation. A personal injury action has
been brought against him in his personal, non-lawyer, part-ownership of an apartment building [sic]. His insurance carrier has requested you to defend him.

53. Id.
54.. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(a), (b).
55. NJ. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.7(c)(2) ("[Miultiple representation is not permissiin those situations in which an ordinary knowledgeable citizen acquainted with the
ble ...
facts would conclude that the multiple representation poses substantial risk of disservice to
either the public interest or the interest of one of the clients."). The nebulous "appearance of
impropriety" standard, which was contained in Canon 9 of the Model Code, was specifically
rejected by the drafters of the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.9 cmt.

(noting that disqualification should be based on a "functional analysis," not the "very general
concept" of the "appearance of impropriety").
56. New Jersey 678, supra note 52, at 3 (1994).
57. Iowa State Bar Ass'n Comm. of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Formal Op. 92-28

(1993).
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In actual practice lawyers are entitled to be defended by counsel even as nonprofessionals are. The mere fact that the lawyers
involved have been adversaries in other, non-related litigation
should not affect their professional responsibilities or conduct.
It is the opinion of the committee that there is no impropriety
in this proposed representation."
Opinion 86-45 of the Professional Guidance Committee of the
Philadelphia Bar Association ("Philadelphia Committee") 9 reflects a
conclusion almost as stark as that of the Iowa opinion. In its entirety,
the Philadelphia opinion states:
INQUIRY: Inquirer represents a minor in a personal injury matter.
The defendant is represented by a law firm which represents inquirer and his family in personal matters having nothing to do with this
personal injury action. Inquirer wants to know whether there is any
conflict.

OPINION: Chairman advised inquirer that there is no conflict.
Chairman suggested to inquirer that he might wish to disclose the
situation to his client (or the client's legal representative) to avoid
any potential embarrassment should the matter be raised otherwise.'
In essence, the Philadelphia Committee viewed the matter as one of
client relations, not of ethics.
At least part of the Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State
Bar Association ("Maryland Committee") also embraced this more
progressive approach. In its Opinion 82-4,6 the Maryland Committee
was presented with the following circumstances: A partner in the
inquirer's law firm was defending Attorney X in a legal malpractice
action, while Attorney X was representing a client in an unrelated
personal injury claim against a party being represented by the
inquirer's law firm.62 The Maryland Committee recognized that the
situation was "one step removed" from the conventional problem of
having a client as an adverse party (i.e., the circumstance addressed
by Model Rule 1.7(a) or Model Code DR 5-105), and expressed the
view that "the fact that you represented a fellow member of the bar

58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 86-45 (1986).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Maryland State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Informal Op. 82-4 (1981) [hereinafter Maryland 82-4].
62. id.
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in a legal malpractice action does not necessarily mean that your firm
and your client-attorney may not represent clients who have opposing
interests in an unrelated matter."'63
The Maryland Committee proceeded to address the problem
based on the nature of the matters in question.' Instead of applying
a mechanical rule based solely on structural considerations, i.e., who
was representing whom, the Maryland Committee expressed a clear
willingness to look at the facts and assess the risks to the respective
clients if the representation was permitted to continue.' Opinion 824 proceeds with a thoughtful analysis of the facts and circumstances,
observing that defense of a client in a personal injury action does not
place the lawyer in a position of having to attack the competency or
integrity of the client-attorney (which could be disadvantageous to the
client-attorney in the malpractice case), and that defending a case in
an unrelated matter that the client-attorney is prosecuting does not
imperil confidences or secrets of the client-attorney learned in the
course of the malpractice case.' The Maryland Committee continued:
Objectively speaking, then, your law firm may competently and
vigorously defend Attorney X in a legal malpractice action while at
the same time maintain a professional adversarial relationship in
matters that are completely unrelated to the malpractice claim. However, depending on the seriousness of the malpractice claim against
him and on the degree of personal and professional ego involvement
that has developed in the relationship between Attorney X and the
partner who represents him, Attorney X may be adversely affected
by appearing as opposing counsel against a member of your firm.
Furthermore, even though Attorney X and the members of
your firm appearing as opposing counsel may quite honestly believe
that their exercise of independent professional judgment may not be
adversely affected, either or both personal injury clients may be
concerned that their interests will not be as zealously protected or
defended as a result of the attorney-client relationship established
between Attorney X and your firm.67
The Maryland Committee did not take the logical next step,
however, and opine that if, from an objective standpoint, the inde-

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pendent professional judgment of the lawyers was not likely to be
compromised, neither disclosure nor consent of the clients was required.' Indeed, here the Maryland Committee divided. The majority
expressed the view that, in the circumstances, "full disclosure should
be made to the personal injury clients" and their consent obtained
before the representation could be undertaken.6 9 The Maryland Committee was also divided as to whether the nature of the representation
of Attorney X needed to be described for the personal injury clients,
the view that the clients need only be told "that the representation involves a separate, independent personal matter, without specifying the
nature of the representation" having greater support."
A minority of the Maryland Committee expressed the view that
"representation of a fellow member of the bar in a legal malpractice
action does not necessarily satisfy the standards set forth in DR 5105(A) and (B) that the independent professional judgment of the
lawyer 'will be or is likely to be adversely affected.""'7 Only if the
attorneys determined that there was a potential adverse impact on
their independent professional judgment, the minority observed, would
the consent provisions be applicable.' "The minority believes that
the decision of the majority is painted with too broad a stroke and
should not be applicable to all factual situations."
More recently, the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Bar Association ("Kentucky Committee") echoed the reasoning of the Maryland dissent.74 While strongly suggesting that the affected clients be
consulted, at least in cases in which the lawyer-lawyer representation
involves litigation, the Kentucky Committee observed:
In both litigation and non-litigation settings the question is
whether the representation of any of the lawyer's clients may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client
or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests.... It is
conceivable that a lawyer might reasonably come to the conclusion
that the representation of the client or clients will not be materially
limited, particularly if the representation occurs in a non-litigation
setting. If some concern is presented by the facts and circumstances

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See infra part ll1.A.
Maryland 82-4, supra note 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. E-355 (1993).
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of the case, then consent may cure the conflict; but only if the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely
affected and if the client consents after consultation!'
These opinions reflect a refreshing willingness to look at the
substance of the affiliation, instead of strictly its structure, in determining whether and to what extent a conflict of interest exists.76
3. The Travesty of New York State 579
The most prominent and comprehensive opinion on adversaryclient relationships is also the most susceptible to criticism. In its
Opinion 579, released in 1987 ("New York State 579"),77 the New
York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics ("New
York State Committee") espoused an unfortunate adulteration of the
conflict of interest rules, and then misapplied its misbegotten rule to
the facts presented. 78 The consequence was a ruling that suffered
representation of an adversary only when there was no conceivable
conflict, and then only with client consent.79
To its credit, the New York State Committee rejected-at least
facially-the per se approach of New York City 502 and concluded
that a lawyer ("Attorney A") could agree to represent an adversary
("Attorney B") in a personal and unrelated matter, provided all of the
clients involved in the litigation consented." It did so, however, on
the basis of a rule purely of its own construction:
It is the view of this Committee that the Code does not mandate a per se disqualification. In the first instance, both Attorney A
and Attorney B must satisfy themselves that the creation of an attorney-client relationship between them will not compromise in any
way the representation of their existing clients in the pending litigation in which they represent adverse parties. If there is doubt in the

mind of either attorney that the dual representation by Attorney A
might affect any settlement recommendation, litigation strategy or

75. Id.(citations omitted).
76. See CAL. R. PRoF. CoNDucr 3-320 ("A member [of the California State Bar] shall
not represent a client in a matter in which another party's lawyer is a . .. client of the
member .. .unless the member informs the client in writing of the relationship." (emphasis
added)). See generally Arthur Garwin, When Lawyers Need Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994,

at 97.
77. New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 579 (1987)
[hereinafter New York State 579].
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. lId.
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other professional judgments either attorney might be called upon to
make on behalf of those existing clients, then Attorney A should
decline the proffered employment. If, on the other hand, both attorneys are confident that representation of their existing clients will
not be compromised in any manner by Attorney A's acceptance of
Attorney B as a client in an unrelated matter and if the existing
clients in the pending litigation both give their informed consent to
the dual representation following full disclosure, then Attorney A
may properly accept employment by Attorney B.'
The New York State Committee's analysis, to the extent it is
discemable, is open to attack. While the opinion cites both DR 5-101
and DR 5-105, it never states which-if either-provision applies to
Attorney A (or to Attorney B, for that matter). 2 In fact, the New
York State Committee applied neither 5-101 nor 5-105, but instead
invented the following test: whether the arrangement will "compromise in any way the representation of their existing clients in the
pending litigation in which they represent adverse parties." 3
New York State 579 proceeds to require client consent even if
"both attorneys are confident that representation of their existing
clients will not be compromised in any manner. . . ."" This requirement is not justified by any provision of the Model Code. In
reality, it is contrary to DR 5-101 and DR 5-105, the very provisions
upon which it purports to be predicated. DR 5-101(A), the provision
that rightfully applies, requires client consent only when a lawyer's
professional judgment on behalf of a client wil be, or reasonably
may be, affected by the lawyer's own interests." If the standard of
New York State 579 is satisfied, that is, the representation of both
clients "will not be compromised in any manner," DR 5-101(A) has
not even been violated, and there is no conflict for any client to
waive.
Similarly, if the representation of the clients in question "will not
be compromised in any manner" by the proposed retention of adversary counsel, it cannot be the case that the independent professional
judgment of the lawyers "will be or is likely to be adversely affected," nor would either lawyer be involved in representing an interest
that "will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of [the]
81. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-101(A).
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lawyer to a client."' 6 Hence, if New York State 579's synthetic standard is satisfied, DR 5-105 has not been violated either, and again
there is no conflict for any client to waive.
What, then, does New York State 579 mean? The New York
State Committee requires the lawyer to decline the proffered represen-

tation of adversary counsel if there is any doubt in either attorney's
mind that the representation of their existing clients in the pending

litigation in which they represent adverse parties could be compromised in any way.' The Opinion, in effect, creates a substantially
lower threshold for disqualification in cases of attorney-adversary representations by purporting to prohibit such representations outright if
either attorney has lingering "doubts." Because indecision alone man-

dates disqualification without any provision for cure through informed
client consent, New York State Opinion 579 purports to apply a per
se standard remarkably higher than that required by the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the New York State Com-

mittee in New York State 579 not only created an ad hoc standard
for cases of lawyer-adversary retention, it purported to impose an
enhanced and unprecedented burden on lawyers: to obtain the consent
of their clients to a proposed representation even in the absence of a
conflict of interest."
The New York State Committee was not alone, however, in its
approach. One of the opinions it cited was Opinion 822 of the Advi-

sory Committee on Professional Conduct of the Illinois State Bar

86. New York State 579, supra note 77, at 4; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-

105(A), (B).
87. New York State 579, supra note 77.
88. Nassau County (New York) Opinion Number 2/88 held that consent was required in
similar circumstances because of the "appearance of impropriety" language in Canon 9 of the
Code. Nassau County Bar Ass'n, Op. 2/88 (1987). New York State 579, released several
months earlier, was not cited. It is generally recognized, however, that unless the proceedings
are likely to be tainted, "appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to
rest a disqualification order." Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir.
1979). See generally 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WnLijAM HODES, TiE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 1.9:107 (2d ed. 1990). But see Solow v. W.R. Grace & Co., 632 N.E.2d 437
(N.Y. 1994). Similarly, Nebraska State Bar Association Advisory Opinion Number 93-1,
citing New York State 579, held "that an attorney may represent another attorney while opposing that attorney in pending litigation only in limited circumstances," and that full disclosure and consent from the client in the affected litigation was a prerequisite. Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n, Op. 93-1 (1993). Ultimately, the Nebraska Committee ruled that the inquiring
lawyer, who was serving as guardian ad litem for numerous children, was not in the position
of an attorney at all, but was deemed to be a parent under the law. Id
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Association ("Illinois Committee"), released in 1983."9 The question
presented to the Illinois Committee was described as follows:
Lawyer A and Lawyer B frequently represent clients adverse to
each other and at present are involved in several cases in which
their clients are on opposite sides. Lawyer A wishes to engage
Lawyer B to represent him in a suit in which A is a party and our
opinion is sought as to whether Lawyer B may accept such employment.0
Rejecting a prior opinion that had established a per se ban in analogous circumstances based on the "appearance of impropriety,"9 ' the
Illinois Committee relied instead on DR 5-105 and concluded that:
While it is possible that others may question the propriety of representing a lawyer while, at the same time, representing clients with
positions adverse to that lawyer's clients, we find nothing presented
in the facts justifying speculation that either A or B's clients will be
prejudiced or harmed by such representation. We further see no appearance of impropriety which, standing alone, automatically would
preclude Lawyer B from accepting employment by Lawyer A.'
Nevertheless, the Illinois Committee concluded that both lawyers
were compelled "to make full disclosure of such representation to
those clients affected and to obtain consents from each of them."
The root of this requirement was not that the lawyers' independent
professional judgment would or would likely be adversely affected as
required by DR 5-105, but only "[b]ecause of the possibility that such
representation could affect Lawyer B's independent professional judgment." 4 As discussed above, DR 5-105 requires at least a likelihood
that the attorney's independent professional judgment will be adversely affected, or that a likelihood that the lawyer will be involved in
representing an interest that will affect the judgment or loyalty of the
attorney to a client. 95

89. Illinois State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm. on Professional Conduct, Op. 822 (1983)
[hereinafter Illinois 822].
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Illinois State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm. on Professional Conduct, Op.

724 (1981)).

92. Illinois 822, supra note 89, at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-105. Recently, the Illinois Committee revisited
the issue in Opinion 92-18. See Illinois State Bar Ass'n Advisory Comm. on Professional
Conduct, Op. 92-18 (1993). Following the adoption of the Model Rules in Illinois, the 1111-
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I.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD

The principal observation that can be made, based on the foregoig review of the authorities that have grappled with the conflict of
interest issues in the adversary-client context, is that there is no
agreement as to either the identity of the proper standard or the manner in which it should be applied. This Article proposes that analysis
of tangible fact, and not rigid formalism, is the only sensible method
for resolving these matters. Each situation must be evaluated independently in light of its peculiar circumstances. Notwithstanding the
appearance of clarity and neatness, and thus the attractiveness, of
bright-line rules, their inherent inflexibility is unjustified in the absence of recurring facts and palpable guideposts. Therefore, when a
determination must be made based on an interrelated series of judgments and predictions, a bright-line rule is ineffectual, if not pernicious.
A. Developing a Flexible Approach
Let us return to the hypothetical posited above. Louise Lawyer is
contemplating entering into an attorney-client relationship with a
partner in a law firm that is representing an adverse party in an unrelated litigation she is handling for a client. Because Lawyer is not
taking on a new client, there can be no concern that her independent
professional judgment on behalf of her client, Modest Industries, will
be adversely affected by her representation of another client, as under
DR 5-105 or Rule 1.7(a). Those rules are simply inapplicable to her.
Reference must instead be made to the rules designed to protect a
client relationship from being adversely affected by the personal interests of the lawyer.'
Having identified the proper "pigeon-hole," at least from
Lawyer's standpoint, the next step in the analysis is to determine

nois Committee concluded under Model Rule 1.7(b) that a lawyer could represent criminal
defendants even though the lawyer's firm represented the prosecutors of those cases in unrelated civil proceedings, provided that all of the criminal defendants consented after full disclosure. Id. Full disclosure, the linois Committee opined, had to "extend to the implications of
[the firm's] representation [of the prosecutors], in sufficient breadth to permit the client[s] to
appreciate the significance of the firm's relationship with the prosecutors." Id.
96. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5101(A). See generally Lawyer's Interests Adverse to Client, Laws Man. on Prof. Conduct

(ABA/BNA) § 51:401 to :414 (Feb. 28, 1990).
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whether the applicable rules are triggered by Lawyer's retention of
Edward Ethical. Model Rule 1.7(b) would prevent Lawyer from continuing her representation of Modest Industries (absent consent) if that
representation may be materially limited by her own interestsY Similarly, Model Code DR 5-101(A) would bar Lawyer from continuing
to represent Modest (absent consent) if the exercise of her independent professional judgment on behalf of Modest will be or reasonably
may be affected by her own financial, business, property or personal
interests.98
What "interest" of Lawyer could have such an impact? Her primary interest is in having the disciplinary charges against her dismissed, and for this reason she has sought out Edward Ethical of
Megafirm. The theoretical risk to Modest is that Lawyer will be less
inclined to take aggressive positions against Megafirm to preserve her
personal business relationship with Ethical. For this risk to be a legitimate one, however, there must also be a corresponding risk that
Ethical would be less inclined to fulfill his duty to be a zealous advocate on Lawyer's behalf because she is being too formidable an
adversary in the Modest v. Titanic case. In other words, Lawyer
would have no reason to muzzle her representation of Modest unless
she reasonably believed that Ethical would be a less effective lawyer
on her behalf if she were an aggressive advocate. The risks are interrelated, and cannot be assessed without some evaluation of specific
facts surrounding Megafirm's representation of Titanic, tempered by
the reasonableness imparted by the objectivity traditionally brought to
bear when assessing conflicts of interest.
Megafirm similarly cannot agree to represent Lawyer unless it
also resolves any conflict of interest problems it may have.
Megafirm's financial or business interests theoretically could impinge
upon its independent professional judgment on behalf of Titanic if,
for example, its interest in preserving the income stream from Lawyer
is of a sufficient magnitude that it is tempted to be less aggressive in
the course of its representation of Titanic in order to avoid offending
Lawyer. This risk may be significant, or it may be laughable. The
key assessment is whether the materiality to Megafinr of the income
stream from its representation of Lawyer so substantially exceeds the
importance of the firm's relationship with Titanic that the enticement
will exist for the firm to violate its ethical duties to the latter. This is
97. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
98. See discussion supra part ll.A.2.
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not simply an accounting question, but is dependent upon a variety of
factors relating to the scope and duration of the attorney-client relationships and the functions being performed by the firm for the respective clients.
Does Megafirm also have a problem by virtue of its representation of clients with differing or conflicting interests? Absent extreme
circumstances, it does not. As noted above, Model Rule 1.7(a) prevents a lawyer from representing a client "if the representation of that
client will be directly adverse to another client."" Model Code
DR 5-105 states that a lawyer may not accept or continue employment by a client if the lawyer's "independent professional judgment
in behalf of [another] client will be or is likely to be adversely affected... or if it would be likely to involve [the lawyer] in representing differing interests," which are defined as including "every
interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of
a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse,
or other interest."''
The two clients being represented by Megafirm are not Modest
and Titanic, but Lawyer and Titanic. While there most certainly is a
relationship between Modest and Lawyer, it can by no means be
inferred that Modest and Lawyer have such a unity of interest that
they must be considered one and the same for conflict of interest
purposes. Indeed, in a variety of contexts, distinctions are made between even more closely related persons or entities for purposes of
determining the identity of the client. Most prominent among these
distinctions is that between a corporation and its constituents; a lawyer who represents the corporate entity does not automatically also
represent its officers and directors, notwithstanding the fact that a
corporation can only act through officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and other constituents."°' Similarly, the contract that gives
rise to the attorney-client relationship does not merge the two into a

single unit.
This is not to say that lawyers and clients can never be considered "the same" for conflict of interest purposes. Although it is not
inconceivable, it would only be in an extreme case that the intimacy
and intensity of the attorney-client relationship would counsel in favor

99. See discussion supra part H.A.1.
100. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
101. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.13 & cmts.; MODEL CODE, supra note 8,
EC 5-18; N.Y. Jim. LAW app. DR 5-109(A) (McKinney 1992).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[VCol. 23:791

of deeming the lawyer to be so closely aligned with his or her client
in certain matters as to make representation of the lawyer tantamount
to representation of the client, or vice versa. To illustrate, consider
that a lawyer who has devoted seventy-five percent of his time for
the last twenty years to the representation of a single client is plainly
more closely aligned with the client than a lawyer who represents the
client in an isolated short-lived case."°e More likely, however, the
only reason to equate lawyer and client would be if confidential information imparted by the one would be useful in the representation
adverse to the other;, this would raise concerns wholly apart from any
conflict of interest. In any case, as with the other aspects of this
analysis, the facts surrounding the attorney-client relationship must be
examined; bright-line rules are inappropriate.
Thus, in determining whether it must also look to the concurrent
representation rules of the Model Rules or Model Code, Megafirm
must first assess whether Lawyer and Modest Industries must be
considered a single client for conflict of interest purposes. Even if the
concurrent representation rules did apply, Megafirm would still have
to assess the degree, if any, to which its representation of Titanic is
likely to be adversely affected by its representation of a person
deemed to be part of Titanic's adversary. This, too, is a fact-specific
determination. Our hypothetical contains no facts to suggest that the
Lawyer-Modest affiliation is anything more than the standard, arm'slength attorney-client relationship.
In sum, absent some unusual circumstance justifying agglomeration of the represented lawyer and his or her client, it is the connection between the two lawyers that is viewed as the potential contaminant in the pre-existing attorney-client relationships. Several factors,
suggested in whole or in part by the ethics committee opinions discussed above, 3 should be taken into account in judging whether
the risk of contamination is sufficiently great as to require the consent
of the clients to the proposed lawyer-lawyer representation: (a) the
102. Analogies may be drawn to cases in which corporations and their parent or subsidiaries
are deemed to be the same "clienf' for conflict of interest purposes. These cases, too,
look at the facts and make an independent determination of the degree of interrelationship
between the entities. See, e.g., Teradyne, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1143,
1146 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp.
534, 541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 95-390
(1995); New York County Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 684 (1992);
California Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989113 (1990).
103. See discussion supra part H.B.
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intensity and duration of the relationship between the adversaries; (b)
the intensity and duration of the adversaries' relationships with their
respective clients; (c) the nature of the lawyer-lawyer representation;
(d) the nature of the work currently being performed by the lawyers
for their respective clients; (e) the relationship, if any, between the
lawyer-lawyer representation and the representation of either client;
and (f) the relative importance of the representations to the respective
lawyers or firms.
None of these factors should be dispositive; they are not set
forth in order of relative importance. They are a means by which an
objective viewer can divine the tangibility of a sufficient risk to the
representation of an existing client to justify disclosing the lawyerlawyer affiliation to the clients and conditioning that affiliation upon
securing client consent.
B. PracticalApplications of the Flexible Approach
Analyzing our hypothetical against this framework results in the
conclusion that there is no conflict of interest for either Lawyer or
Megafirm. From Megafirm's perspective, its long-standing and highly
lucrative relationship with Titanic is far more important to it than the
transitory representation of Lawyer. Lawyer and Ethical did not have
any relationship with one another prior to the current representation.
There is no apparent relationship, either factually or substantively,
between the disciplinary charges against Lawyer and the Modest v.
Titanic case, thereby substantially eliminating the risk that confidential
information received from Lawyer in her capacity as client would be
used to her disadvantage or otherwise misused. In addition, even
though Adversary and Ethical must be treated as one for conflict of
interest purposes," the separation between the two attenuates substantially any residual effect the Lawyer-Ethical affiliation might have
on the Modest v. Titanic case being handled by Adversary. Hence,
the risk that Titanic will be ill-served by virtue of its law firn's
retention by Lawyer is negligible.
If any factor points to a different conclusion, it is the nature of
the firm's representation of Lawyer. Megafirm's duty to advocate
dismissal of the conversion charges against Lawyer may result in a
reluctance to make personal attacks against her, including seeking

104. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.10(a); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5105(D).
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sanctions on behalf of Titanic, for fear of jeopardizing her position
before the disciplinary authorities. But this unwillingness does not
implicate the merits of the Modest-Titanic dispute. A lawyer's professional responsibilities must take into account the role of professional
courtesy in the adversarial process. Lawyers are not required to press
every procedural advantage they might obtain against their colleagues,
even if their clients might prefer that they do so. As long as the
lawyer and the client agree upon the objectives of the representation,
and the lawyer pursues those objectives in a manner consistent with
the standards of practice of the legal community, the lawyer is not
ethically bound to do more.'
Thus, Megafirm may undertake the representation of Lawyer
without having to consult and obtain the consent of Titanic. It is
important to bear in mind that, under the applicable rules, even if
Megafirm reasonably concluded that it did have a business or professional interest that conflicted with its duty to Lawyer, the only client
that would have to consent would be Lawyer herself, and not Titanic.
Model Rule 1.7(b) and Model Code DR 5-101(A), only require consent of the client whose representation is likely to be adversely affected. The client presumptively favored has no right, and no reason, to
veto the lawyer-lawyer relationship."c
From Lawyer's perspective, the situation is not substantially
different. She is perfectly capable of reaching the conclusion that the
only client realistically at risk of having a less-than-zealous representation is herself. Any thought that Lawyer's aggressive prosecution of
Modest's claims against Titanic is likely to be dampened by her
desire not to offend Megafirm and risk having a substandard representation before the disciplinary body is unreasonable because of the
realities of the situation at Megafirm. Certainly, such a result cannot
and should not be presumed, particularly if counterbalanced by a
long-standing and important professional relationship between Lawyer
and Modest. Thus, in the absence of objective facts indicating that

105. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.2 cmt; MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7101(a)(1).
106. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.2(c); Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc. v.
Altagen, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Ct. App. 1980); Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650 (Idaho 1982);
Delta Equip. & Const. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 186 So.2d 454 (La. 1966); Martini v.
Leland, 455 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Civ. Ct. 1982); WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 13.3.6; cf. FREEDMAN,
supra note 35, at 57-64.
107. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 22, § 206 (stating that only the "affected client" must consent if a lawyer's personal interest affects the representation of a client).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol23/iss4/2

28

Krane: When Lawyers Represent Their Adversaries: Conflicts of Interest A
19951

WHEN LAWYERS REPRESENT THEIR ADVERSARIES

Megafirm is likely to represent Lawyer with less vigor if she is too
contentious in her dealings with Adversary, Lawyer need not seek the
consent of her client, Modest, to her retention of Ethical in the disciplinary matter.
It would be impossible to attempt to address every conceivable
combination of factors and their implications under the conflict of

interest rules. Suffice it to say that, viewed objectively, there will be
circumstances in which it is clear that there is no conflict of interest
for either lawyer, circumstances in which it is clear that both lawyers

have a conflict of interest (requiring consent of both clients after full
disclosure), and gradations in between. Indeed, it is conceivable that

there could be a conflict so severe that any consent would not be
effective. Under Model Rule 1.7(b)(1), consent is not available unless

the affected lawyer "reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected." ' Although Model Code DR 5-101(A), speaks
only of obtaining consent after full disclosure, without any limitation
whatsoever, that provision, at least in New York, has been interpreted
in a manner that engrafts upon it the limitation on consentability
contained in DR 5-105(C); i.e., it must be "obvious that [the lawyer]
can adequately represent the interests of each" client."°
Nonconsentability, however, must be limited to the most extreme of
conflicts, those in connection with which an objective lawyer would
urge the client to withhold consent."'
This Article has focused on the hypothetical setting of Louise
Lawyer, who is seeking representation in a disciplinary matter from

108. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b).
109. New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 635 (1992) [hereinafter New York State 635] (citing New York St. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
595 (1988)). New York State 635 opines:
While DR 5-101(A) provides that a client may consent to representation by
a lawyer whose financial, business, property or personal interests differ from those
of the client, thereby waiving the conflict of interst, consent is ineffective if there
is a reasonable probability (viewed objectively) that the lawyer's interests will
affect adversely the advice to be given or the services to be rendered to the client.
New York State 635, supra.
110. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 270 S.E.2d 185 (Ga.) (holding that waiver of conflict
not permitted in capital case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980); Sapienza v. New York, 481
F. Supp 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that lawyer could not represent two clients with
likely claims against one another in a single litigation even with the consent of both);
Klemm v. Superior Ct., 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that lawyer could not
represent both parties in a contested child support hearing even with consent); In re Kelly,
244 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that law firm could not represent insurer and claimant
under an insurance policy even with consent). See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 7;

§ 7.2.3.
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the law firm representing a party adverse to one of her clients. While
the framework described herein should be fully applicable in any
other context, the nature of the proposed attorney-adversary representation will have a substantial impact on the degree of risk to the
clients of the respective lawyers. A return to the six categories of
representation discussed in Part I above is therefore warranted.
The least troublesome representation, it would seem, would be
the retention of an adversary in a purely personal matter. Lawyer's
retention of a lawyer in Megafirm-even Adversary himself, for that
matter-to represent her in the purchase of a condominium apartment,
for example, raises concerns no greater than those present if the adversaries also happen to be good personal friends. Presumably, the
intensity or intimacy of the relationship could rise to the level of a
personal interest sufficient to impact upon client loyalty, but there is
no basis for concluding that client loyalty is at all impinged in the
routine case of adversaries who happen to like one another or see
each other socially. Such should be the conclusion when a lawyer
retains an adversary to provide purely personal legal services.'
The result should be no different when the adversary is retained
to represent the lawyer in her business dealings. Louise Lawyer's
retention of Megafirm to represent her law office in negotiations over
a new office space lease is analytically indistinguishable from the
purchase of the residential condominium. Similarly, the rendition of
specialized business advice, such as in the tax or labor fields, would
seem to pose no threat in itself to the lawyers' loyalty to their respective clients. It should reasonably follow that representations related to intra-firm disputes, such as those that may arise under the
firm's partnership agreement or that relate to the departure of lawyers,
are also not problematic absent some identifiable factual nexus between that matter and the matter in which the lawyer and adversary
are representing adverse parties. As in any case, if the financial aspects of the relationship between lawyer and adversary reach a level
of materiality to either one, there may be a sufficient business interest
to give rise to a conflict of interest and require the clients' informed
consent.

111. But see Michigan CI-649, supra note 47 (finding the personal matter and the professional matter were too closely related to permit both to be undertaken simultaneously).
Unlike the conflict of interest represented above, the problem in the Michigan opinion is the
risk of misuse of the attorney's confidences or secrets on behalf of the adversary's clients.
Id.
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Heightened concern may be warranted when the representation
relates to difficulties encountered in the actual practice of law. As
noted above, an adversary may be less willing to challenge the conduct of a lawyer even in unrelated litigation if that could conceivably
impact upon his representation of his client-lawyer in a malpractice or
disciplinary case. Whether, as a result, the representation reasonably
may affect the adversary's independent professional judgment on
behalf of his client-litigant will be dependent upon the degree to
which the conduct at issue in the malpractice or disciplinary case
parallels that which has occurred or is likely to occur in the litigation.
Less problematic would be the rendition of confidential advice, outside the litigation context, on legal or ethical issues relating to the
practice of law, where the risk of overtly prejudicing the client-lawyer
through conduct undertaken in the client matter is absent. Conversely,
any presumed diminution in loyalty caused by a theoretical reluctance
to attack the character of the lawyer for tactical advantage is irrelevant if the client matter is not a litigation.'12
The last two categories discussed in Part I of this Article-lawyer as co-counsel or expert witness-are only problematic to
the extent that the expectation of future income from their retention
reaches a sufficient level of materiality. It is the retained lawyer's
interest in preserving the stream of referral income, and the corresponding ability of the retaining lawyer to direct client dollars to one
particular co-counsel, expert, or another that provides the financial
interest element here. Consider a situation in which Megafirm routinely hires Lawyer to serve as co-counsel on trademark matters. Over
fifty percent of Lawyer's income during the past three years was
derived from Megafirm clients for whom she performed services.
Lawyer's business and financial interest in preserving her relationship
with Megafirm could reasonably affect the manner in which she conducts litigation on behalf of Modest Industries against Megafirm's
client, Titanic Enterprises, raising a conflict of interest under Model
Rule 1.7(b) or Model Code DR 5-101(A). These circumstances would
require disclosure to, and consent from, Modest before undertaking
the representation.'
112. In any of these circumstances, the client-lawyer should periodically evaluate the
remote threat that confidential information relating to the lawyer or the firm may somehow

be useful to the adversary in the matter in which they are both representing clients. A dilemma could arise in those circumstances for the client-lawyer, who would have to choose between circumspection in communications with the adversary and providing ammunition for

potential use against the client-lawyer's client. See MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 5-15.
113. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, Rule 1.7(b); MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has urged the restoration of a degree of
pragmatism to the application of conflict of interest rules, at least in
the limited context of lawyer-adversary professional relationships.
There is, however, no reason why such an approach should not be
employed in all conflict of interest analyses. An unfortunate trend
among many courts and ethics committees has been to treat our ethics
codes as inflexible dogma, a propensity that has fueled the often criticized practice of seeking disqualification of adversary counsel for
purely tactical or even vexatious reasons." 4
We have lost sight of the valid and important principles that our
conflict of interest rules were designed to safeguard. Many interpretations of our ethics rules are almost teleological, driven by the desire
to reach predetermined results, instead of being deeply rooted in the
fundamental principles underlying the attorneys' code of conduct. It is
time to reject this empty formalism, and recognize that every case
presents its own unique matrix of operative fact that must be analyzed on its merits, giving due consideration to the guiding ethical
precepts and the legitimate expectations of clients.
The latter point cannot be overemphasized. We no longer live in
a world in which "one lawyer, one client" is the archetype. As the
court observed in Artromick Internationalv. Drustar,Inc.:"
Given the complexity of today's world, and the significance of legal
matters in both business and personal endeavors, the manner in
which clients use attorneys is both varied and evolving. The concepts of having a "personal attorney" or a "general corporate counsel" are much less meaningful today, especially among sophisticated
users of legal services, than in the past. Clients may have numerous
attorneys, all of whom have some implicit continuing loyalty obligations. Attorney specialization and marketing have contributed to this
fractionalizing of a single client's business." 6

101(A).
114. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1576-77
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 721-22 (7th

Cir. 1982); Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); S&S Hotel Ventures Ltd.
Partnership v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508 N.E.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1987).
115. 134 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
116. Artromick, 134 F.R.D. at 231-32; see also SWS Financial Fund A v. Salomon Bros.,
790 F. Supp. 1392, 1402-03 (N.D. Il. 1992).
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The legitimate expectations of a client in the 1990s should not
be viewed as including absolute and undivided loyalty on the part of
any lawyer the client retains for any purpose, regardless of how trivial. Perhaps, in a more innocent time, in a more tranquil and uncomplicated time, a client could reasonably assume that the lawyer he or
she retained would never do anything disadvantageous to his or her
interests. The 1990s, however, are not innocent, tranquil or uncomplicated, and the tenets of far more ingenuous times cannot continue
to be interpreted as if their original intent was not obsolete.
Flexibility, and a willingness to scrutinize the facts of each case,
must be the overarching principles by which conflicts are resolved as
we approach the millennium. This Article has addressed that precept
in one limited context, in the hopes that the remaining barriers to the
employment of prudent and rational standards can be overcome.
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